Paper #: 4.3.13
Title:  The Sybil Attack

1. Problems
-In distributed computing systems, without a logically centralized authority it is difficult to maintain robustness and security measures. 
Malicious users can take advantage of the decentralized trust system to reroute messages and misrepresent themselves. In this case, the issue 
of spoofing / representing multiple identities is discussed.

2. New Idea and Strengths
-The paper proves that without the centralized authority control, it is in fact impossible to prevent "Sybil attacks". No method if identification 
can prevent hosts from fraudulent identification. In a recomendation system, only one fradulent host in the system can propogated unlimited numbers. 
Individual testing quickly becomes impractical in terms of system demands. Minimizing attack possibilities would also significantly weaken the system efficiency.

3. Weaknesses and Extensions
-The argument's scope is limited. Decentralized authority dictates an anonymous user base, so identification is intentionally difficult. One cannot 
expect strong identification without requiring any proof.
-The biggest notion that can be derived from this paper is that no decentralized p2p system should count on unique / trusted identities, such that 
any user interaction must be robust enough to handle a high probability of attack.