Paper #:[4.3.2 Trust] #3 Title: "Reputation Systems: Facilitating Trust in Internet Interactions" by Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman, Ko Kuwabara PROBLEM The internet is a great medium to purchase products from individual sellers. However, with this opportunity comes risks because there is no guarantee that the seller can trust that the buyer will purchase the item that they may have won on an auction or that the buyer will receive the item that he paid for in the expected condition. In order to alleviate the problem, "reputations" have been used so that there are some consequences to being a poor citizen or rewards for being an outstanding citizen in this community of shopping. The opinions given by users are not only important for making decisions on who to buy from but also with making decisions on what to buy, which is why websites such as cnet.com are useful. In the end the success of a reputation system needs the following characteristics: future interaction is expected, information is easily available, and other people care about previous feedback. NEW IDEAS AND STRENGTHS *The paper did a good job of determining the three characteristics needed, which are long-lived entities, captured and distributed feedback, and old feedback aids buying decisions. *The reference to the economist was helpful with conveying the message that good sellers need to be rewarded in order to prevent a "Market for Lemons". This market would result if all of the quality sellers left due to not being rewarded for putting in the extra effort of being a good citizen. *The idea of eBayers negotiating in order to avoid negative feedback is subtle, but can drastically change the outcome of feedback. *Blackmail and collaboration of people can also skew the true feedback results. *The paper does not attack the current system because it seems to be working despite the possibilities of people taking advantage of it. WEAKNESSES AND EXTENSIONS *The paper lists that eBay displays the net feedback and expresses the need to know the amount of the transaction in order to know how much to weigh the feedback. However, eBay allows users to see recent transaction items as well as the price of those items. Therefore, with eBay this is not a problem. *It would have been nice if the paper had done some more research on the effects of users blackmailing each other in order to receive undeserved positive feedback. While mentioning that this is a problem, it did not attempt to give any solutions. *A possible extension would be to understand why the reputation system works overall despite all of the possibilities of manipulating it.