

## Satan and Golem, inc.

Laurence Rickels

In the twentieth century the Golem legend in its Prague setting made it big: in 1915 in Germany it hit the big screen same time – double feature – that it went public, published in a blockbuster novel by Prague author Gustav Meyrinck. This book, which included among its plot points how-to instructions for simulation of the symptoms of epilepsy, also made the best sell-out list according to medical officers faced with soldiers who preferred to malingering on rather than rush into the world war effort. The scholarship or intellectual history of the idea of the Golem – as set up between the bookends supplied by Gershom Scholem and Moshe Idel – overlooks these screen or scream memories while styling with the cipher and letter magic or mysticism based on *Kabbalah* and *Sefer Yezirah*, among many other texts and traditions.<sup>1</sup> But thanks to the memories, the Golem security screening device comes out in the watch of these scholarly materials as missing, pressing, marked. Even though Idel too neglects admitting the pop reception into his expanded and corrective history of the Golem as Jewish mystical idea, he delineates a timing of Scholem's Golem studies that, even or especially without comment, turns up the volume on the excluded and implied screen texts. It was in 1933 that Scholem found himself all of a sudden taking a controlling research interest in the Golem. Then in 1963 Norbert Wiener's monograph *God and Golem, inc.* sparked Scholem's new reading of the legend to the map of the cipher magic of relations between man and machine.<sup>2</sup> Kept on titular terms as passing acquaintance with the exploration of artificial intelligence and ethics in Wiener's study, the direct connection with the Golem, the point of the title, was then driven home in Scholem's reading. One year later Scholem revisited the Golem idea in a lecture he delivered on the occasion of the arrival of the first computer in Israel.

In *God and Golem, inc.* Wiener proposes a division of labour between man and machine given the state of mechanical intelligence at that time: machines can do the math simply because they are faster and more reliable; humans for their part can wrap their minds around vague ideas, in other words the component parts of literature and art, which the machines reject outright as formless. 'In dealing with these [as yet imperfectly defined ideas], mechanical computers of the present day are very nearly incapable of programming themselves'.<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, however, machines can learn, can improve and program themselves. But even if there were nothing left for the machines to learn, as long as they can't generate themselves out of themselves humans still count at least as the reproductive part of cybernetic society. But replication also already

mediates the gap between us and our future generation – a mediation that is already along for the ride the first time technology sends us. It is ‘conceptually possible’ Wiener states, although he must admit that it is not yet practicable in 1963, ‘for a human being to be sent over a telephone line’.<sup>4</sup> But even if in theory we could be transmitted in this way, in other words from point A to point B, would we indwell this transmission at once as technology and as thought, vague ideas and all. Would our being also be in the transmission? Would we be technological? Because there are machines that can in fact replicate themselves in 1963, Wiener argues along these lines of questioning that technology already and irreversibly stands in relations with us of competition or cohabitation.

Like evolution’s claim of our ape descent, so with the claim that machines can reproduce ‘there attaches something of the reprobation that attached in earlier ages to the sin of sorcery’.<sup>5</sup> It was not so very long ago that someone advancing the claims of cybernetics would have been off to the Inquisition rapid fire for Devil dealing. Here Wiener inserts his one main-text reference to the Golem legend, specifically the Prague variant, namely the media version, as saving exception to someone’s condemnation back then: ‘unless he could convince some great patron that he could transmute the base metals into gold, as Rabbi Löw of Prague, who claimed that his incantations blew breath of life into the Golem of clay, had persuaded the Emperor Rudolf’.<sup>6</sup>

Otherwise Wiener counts the contest between God and Satan as still current context for man and machine relations. Machines began to learn by playing games. No accident. The game plays as basic structure of thinking that can, in exceeding itself, learn – ultimately to program itself. Thus the ‘subject of learning, and in particular of machines that learn to play games’ is still relevant to the age-old religious ‘problem of the game between the Creator and a creation’.<sup>7</sup> ‘If we do not lose ourselves in the dogmas of omnipotence and omniscience, the conflict between God and the Devil is a real conflict, and God [...] is actively engaged in a conflict with his creature, in which he may very well lose the game [...] Can any creator, even a limited one, play a significant game with his own creature?’<sup>8</sup>

While the popular turn to the Golem legend puts protection of the Jews up in lights, the motor of a swing into anti-Semitism is also discernibly running this protection as projection. The problem here is not the ambivalence with regard to assimilation, to becoming ‘like’, to becoming image, nor the transference transgressions against the father that Golem-making requires in exchange for its rescue service. All of that is compatibly or quintessentially Jewish. It is rather the resetting of the legend in its mass media career on compact relations with the Devil – in other words, on the mass of murder – that is a problem, the so-called Jewish problem. Historically the Rabbi Löw chapter of the Golem legend was contemporaneous with the historical background and literary legendary elaboration of Dr. Faust. The one venue for the automatization of human thought that Wiener singles out as marking at least conceivable future progress is mechanical translation. Thus he inserts the opening merger of man and machine in a scene of translation, the scene that in Goethe’s *Faust* forces the Devil to show his and – his complicity with Faustian techno striving. Wiener in turn is tempted to depart from the Old Testament understanding or setting of the Devil’s game and

conjure current examples of cybernetic sinning, such as in cases of so-called gadget worship. Just as the black mass draws on belief in the very powers that good Christians attribute to the host in order to manipulate those powers for self gain or to inflict harm, so it is still the same sin that gadget worshippers commit 'which consists of using the magic of modern automatization to further personal profit or let loose the apocalyptic terrors of nuclear warfare. If this sin is to have a name, let that name be [...] sorcery'.<sup>9</sup>

But sorcery or magic in Wiener's estimation always causes technical difficulties because of the literal-mindedness with which our wishes or desires are administered, represented and repressed. Wiener's identification of this blindspot in magic doubles as a reading of Faust's relations with Mephistopheles in Goethe's coupling. 'The operation of magic is singularly literal-minded, and [...] if it grants you anything at all it grants what you ask for, not what you should have asked for or what you intend'.<sup>10</sup> Wiener gives the magic update and techno forecast in regarding attempts to conjure automatic safety measures, so-called failsafe devices, for example: 'While it is always possible to ask for something other than we really want, this possibility is most serious when the process by which we are to obtain our wish is indirect, and the degree to which we have obtained our wish is not clear until the very end. Usually we realize our wishes, insofar as we do actually realize them, by a feedback process, in which we compare the degree of attainment of intermediate goals with our anticipation of them. In this process, the feedback goes through us, and we can turn back before it is too late. If the feedback is built into a machine that cannot be inspected until the final goal is attained, the possibilities for catastrophe are greatly increased'.<sup>11</sup> In short: 'The penalties for errors of foresight, great as they are now, will be enormously increased as automatization comes into its full use'.<sup>12</sup> Failsafe devices work to direct the mode of failure in a harmless way only if the danger is known. However 'against a danger whose nature has not been already recognized' they are of little value.<sup>13</sup> Wiener would rather not ride in the completely automatic automobile he imagines coming out of the assembly lines of failsafe technology. Indeed, the automatic car sounds like the rocket that one would rather aim than ride. What begins to open wide is a World War II context that in 1963 makes ghost appearances in the Cold War setting. Consider as model for this rewiring or reclaiming of past projections in the early 1960s the case of Specter, the underworld organization that was introduced in the first film versions of Ian Fleming's James Bond adventures as third party to and parasite of the Cold War oppositions.

Although the future, as the uncontrollable time to come coming toward us, would appear withdrawn inside the openendedness or vagueness of human thought, this vague of the future precisely must compute. Therefore, Wiener advises, 'engineering technique [...] must become more and more accustomed to formulate human purposes'.<sup>14</sup> 'The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our intelligence' – also in the sense of forecast or projection, for example in espionage settings.<sup>15</sup> Wiener's bottom-line definition of cybernetics, the new field he founded or co-founded, as 'the study of control and communication in machines and living beings', skips the third C, command, that otherwise completes the trinity of modern military organization, which in World War II was indeed the lab setting not only for Wiener's enabling contacts with artificial intelligence.

Now that Alan Turing's precursor role in the invention of computing during World War II is even getting into Hollywood pictures I don't need to break into and remake the complete scene of his invention of computing out of the race to crack the Nazi German Enigma code. I will instead pick up where I left off in *Nazi Psychoanalysis* – where my focus was fixed on the Nazi German occupation or cathexis of this invention, but with the genealogy of rocket flight, negative feedback, and encoding (and decoding) wrapped around its context to include discussion of the role played in Turing's research by a certain gendering of components of the code to crack – and catch him, in a Cold War setting, in the act of cloning around. We tend to identify the whole modern genre of science fiction (in which, bottom line, replication challenges reproduction) with the Cold nuclear War. But the Cold War more often than not proved to be – like Specter in the movies *Dr. No* and *From Russia With Love* – just a screen memory away from the hot World War that it was either still working on or through or just covering up.

In 1950 Turing wrote an essay that was at the same time a science fiction. In his 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', Turing introduces the rules for a game of imitation by way of answering the question, Can machines think.<sup>16</sup> First he imagines the game played by a man, a woman, and the interrogator who, based on their answers to his questions, answers that need not be truthful, must decide who is which gender. Turing then asks: "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" A, by the way, according to the original example, was the man in the experimental game, which means the new game of decidability or undecidability is played out between doubles, machine and woman. Turing continues raising questions: 'Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?"' Given the third degree, it is conceivable that a form of artificial intelligence could be indistinguishable for human intelligence from human intelligence. Turing furthermore stresses that this form of artificial intelligence will be technological, in other words, mediated and produced. For example, Turing dismisses outright the derivation of a direct transmission from electric or electronic overlaps between technological circuitry and the human nervous system. All along, however, there is one exception to this game of finding artificial intelligence and human intelligence indistinguishable that Turing just cannot get around. It's the phenomenon of telepathy. 'If telepathy is admitted it will be necessary to tighten our test up'. Earlier he admitted that 'unfortunately the statistical evidence, at least for telepathy, is overwhelming'. With the admission of telepathy, then, 'the situation could be regarded as analogous to that which would occur if the interrogator were talking to himself and one of the competitors was listening with his ear to the wall. To put the competitors into a "telepathy-proof room" would satisfy all requirements'. In his test setting any telepathy connections presumably would be live. But as he mentions earlier in regard to the overwhelming evidence of telepathy, 'It is very difficult to rearrange one's ideas so as to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them it does not seem a very big step to believe in ghosts'.<sup>17</sup>

In 1953, in Arthur Clarke's *Childhood's End*, telepathy is doubly marked as the exception making a separation between humans and the alien Overlords who otherwise rule or guide them.<sup>18</sup> The aliens, who are Devil lookalikes or were once

upon a time taken by us for Devils, represent the highest development of consciousness, ego, reason. The future that comes toward the human species is an evolutionary version of union or reunion with God. It is a future that the alien Devil egos, however, will never encounter. The Devils are ordered by the God-like Overmind to protect the human species from its innate mass suicide drive. The alien Devils come to earth as a way more advanced techno culture that can dictate its terms of peace on earth. But it turns out that all this protection was paid to maintain the conditions for the mutation that will end the human species but send its dematerialized sequel into the Overmind. Even though humankind appears, on the scale of its self-entitlement to intellectual and scientific penetration, evolutionarily inferior to the Devil aliens, there is something else in the human makeup that exceeds the understanding that came from outer space. This excess can be found on the margins of our own rational culture in the form of occult inquiry, in particular as evident in the study of telepathy. But this excess or access was the threat the Devil aliens were ultimately sent by the Overmind to contain, as their commander, Karellen, explains to the last couple of parents. ‘All down the ages there have been countless reports of strange phenomena – poltergeists, telepathy, precognition – which you had named but never explained. [...] During the first half of the twentieth century, a few of your scientists began to investigate these matters. [...] The forces they might have unleashed transcended any perils that the atom could have brought. For the physicists could only have ruined the earth: the parapsychicists could have spread havoc to the stars. [...] Let us say that you might have become a telepathic cancer, a malignant mentality’.<sup>19</sup>

The evolutionary mutation of the children on the way to the disappearing act of merger with the Overmind passes through an increasing immediacy of direct, telepathic communication or communion (not only in words but in actions too). Thus telepathy is what tags humankind for this extinction, I mean distinction, but only after the morbid human propensity for spookulation, for telecommunications with the long distant, the deceased, has been excised from the telepathy sets of (or: on the way to) the future.

All over the place, Clarke argued that new and higher forms of intelligence, whether from outer space or in our own future as we evolve in sync (or swim) with the scientific developments getting us into outer space, will be technological. Biology has concluded its evolutionary program. Technology will take over where biology leaves off. This leave taking is what is consummated during merger with the Overmind. What must be conveyed as going on is intelligence, intelligent life, thought without a body. This technological phase of evolution need not be stuck on machines: it could be the parapsychical invisible wave force of the Overmind. In his 1950 story ‘The Sentinel’,<sup>20</sup> Clarke evokes a highly evolved technology that ‘lies far beyond our horizon, perhaps, namely the technology of parapsychical forces’.<sup>21</sup> Clarke also sets up in this story his recurrent definition of what space exploration would represent in a vaster scheme of life forms. In the story an obelisk, a so-called sentinel, was left behind by a more highly evolved species from outer space. Aliens, like the Devil, like to watch, observe and intervene when all systems are go, going their way anyway. ‘They would be interested in our civilization only if we proved our fitness to survive – by crossing space and so escaping from the Earth our cradle. That is the challenge that all intelligent races must

meet, sooner or later'. During World War II Clarke made scientific advances that led, after the war, to the launching of the first satellite, to which he later attributed the 'considerable impact'<sup>22</sup> of already degeocentrizing our view of the universe before – and as precondition for – interplanetary travel. But the challenge issued to mankind from outer space in 'The Sentinel' also admits a down or dead beat: 'The challenge that all intelligent races must meet [...] is a double challenge, for it depends in turn upon the conquest of atomic energy and the last choice between life and death'.<sup>23</sup> The last choice is made for mankind in *Childhood's End*, and which choice was made remains undecidable. Karellen says that the parents that would bear testimony to the change even in the absence of a future coming toward them 'are searching for something that is no longer there'. And in their search they find faces emptier than those of the dead, 'for even a corpse has some record carved by time's chisel upon its features, to speak when the lips themselves are dumb'.<sup>24</sup>

Clarke resettled the Devil within a science fiction about the proper timing of evolution beyond all links with the missing. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud addressed the Demonic in the context or contest of life and death drives.<sup>25</sup> But in the stop and start of his speculations, Freud describes a series of Devil fictions or scenarios, but does so, as he says, only as Devil's advocate, not as client or worshipper. One of Freud's un-cosigned scenarios in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* throws a perfect fit with *Childhood's End*. Freud jumps the gun, death-drive style, and formulates a tentative conclusion: the goal of life is death. How then do the self-preservative instincts fit in? They can now be seen as insurance that the organism will follow its own path to its proper death. The organism wishes to die only in its own fashion. But then Freud drops his role as Devil's advocate and, picking up the ambivalent track of the other, begins again: 'But let us pause for a moment and reflect. It cannot be so. The sexual instincts [...] appear under a very different aspect'.

In *The Confessions of Aleister Crowley: An Autohagiography*, the ancestor of modern polymorphous paganism, in particular the Luciferian direction in this mass or mess, motivates the upsurge of his own rule-busting life, and the concomitant switch in his memoirs from third to first person narration, through his relationship to his father's death.<sup>26</sup> It was the synchronization of his dream of his father's death with his father's actual dying that gave him a rules-and-inhibitions-busting ego. His mother kept hanging around as static on this line of Dad certainty. After years of dreaming of her death one of his dreams did finally coincide with her passing. Crowley suggests, however, that this dream did have the same affective charge as the one (only one was required) that was joined to the father's certain death.

To serve the Devil, you must be without inhibitions on a scale of supernormal to psychopathic. Belief in God or in the alternative occult afterlife styles of vampires or werewolves, for instance, is compatible with an inhibited sensibility, one stuck on loss or still working on it. What the Devil requires is the uninhibited capacity for compensating for a lack through a successful operation of substitution without complications – to the full extent that the lack or loss is even seen as having been required or desired in exchange for the Devil's offer of Dad certainty. The relationship the Devil pitches to prospective clients consists in the deferral of suicide for the quality time it takes before the deadline, one's proper and certain death, along which you sign when you sign with the Devil.

With Dad certainty (in other words with life versus death drives and the Demonic as principle) Freud could pass as philosopher. Devil reference is a passing mention in Freud because the death of the other or the dead other is, like primal repression, one of the nonnegotiable facts of psychic life, based on the inconceivability of one's own death and, hence, of Death. It is this inside view that throws self for a loop through other and keeps us in the vicinity of mourning and unmourning, while also giving us the techno high of egoic immortality or, in the felt absence of replication, mass suicide. The Devil was the password that allowed Freud to join the big boys, the philosophers and journalists, and address Death, even one's own death (or is it father's?).

In so many Faustian fictions and science fictions we see the Devil give time, in exchange for soul, specifically more time, more-of-the-same time but at the same time more focused time, quality time. But the Devil cannot reverse time. The paraphysics of relative time – like the fantastic combos of dead or alive family identifications – remain accessible only to the human psyche or soul. Owing perhaps to the novel's Jungian background and the opening shutting of its recent past, all that is relative or relational in *Childhood's End* is annihilated or reborn as evolutionary progress marching as to God. One flashback comes up only to be dismissed as false analogy: 'Somewhere long ago, he had seen a century-old newsreel of such an exodus. It must have been at the beginning of the First World War – or the Second. There had been long lines of trains, crowded with children, pulling slowly out of the threatened cities'. But: 'these who were leaving now were no longer children, whatever they might be. And this time, there would be no reunion'.<sup>27</sup> The striving for union with God or Overmind, which leaves life as we know it behind, no longer misses the link that makes evolutionary change, a change that comes across like a break or leap because the continuity shot with the stage of development that came right before is a lost loss in generation. But what's the big difference between this break on the upbeat, this Overmind Nirvana, and the mass suicidal embrace of nothingness on death drive.

The duo dynamic of life and death belonged to the diplomatic service of Freud's science. But on the inside track sexual difference or self difference was at the same time guaranteed through psychic excess, for example the excess of the unconscious. Contrary to Jung's understanding and critique, Freud's notion of the unconscious cannot be reduced to the sum total of one's repressions. Nor can it therefore be reduced to lifetime. This being in excess of lifetime does not lead Freud to believe in the immortality of the soul or to sign up with the Devil in order to get back the redemption value on this deposit of excess, the value of a wholeness that would be greater than and would encompass all your partings.

In 1986 Jean-Francois Lyotard positioned between theoretical inquiry into artificial intelligence and science fiction a dialogue in which 'he' and 'she' take a turn reflecting on the question the essay bears as title 'Can Thought Go On Without a Body?'.<sup>28</sup> One of Turing's references in his 1950 essay, Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*, proves an accurate forecast according to Lyotard's thought experiment: we are the genitals of our machines that are doing the evolving for us. But that in several billion years the solar system will certainly cease to exist already changes everything, in particular the private parts we play in the sum or sun total of man and machine relations. That takes care of taking it all so interpersonally. 'He' offers up these calculations that the conditions

of inevitable exile from the solar system will mean that our terrestrial and corporeal selves will not be along for the ride into the future. The reserve of infinitude that gave humanity the power to defer ultimate answers and sustain thought as interminably searching, striving, will come to an end with the last sunset. Materiality (as we know it) will cease to exist. 'No one will ring or hear a funeral bell. Then it will be too late to comprehend that your passionate uncompletable questioning always already depended on a life of the spirit that secretly was also always a form of earthly life'.<sup>29</sup> The end of the solar system amounts, then, to the death of death. 'The death of the sun introduces an irreducible division between death and thought: if death, then no thought. Negation without remainder. No negation that would be a negation of itself so that thought games could be constructed on its basis. Sheer event, catastrophe'.<sup>30</sup>

Because this catastrophe concerns a change in the conditions of matter, the question that can still be raised (like a ghost) is how thought in a concrete sense can remain possible. Technological and scientific research already accepted the wager and must continue to run the race. But, 'he' says, technology predates and produces humanity. More than or before machines technology is in effect the system that identifies, stores, and processes data important for survival in order to derive from regularly recurring patterns certain forms of behavior that protect and sustain life. While the body can be seen as the hardware of our solar-era technology called human thought, language can be seen as the software in search now of new hardware to which to adapt itself. Only after this adaptation or mutation has taken place could the death of the sun mean death as usual. Thinking without a body is the condition for thinking the end of the body, the sun, earth, and that thought that cannot be separated from the body. But, 'he' says, the software transportability of language is still (in 1986) too caught up in binary logic – as demonstrated, among several examples, by the Turing machine and Wiener and Neumann's cybernetics. Human thought doesn't operate with bits but rather admits 'imprecise, ambivalent data'.

'She': some artificial but analogical body must be granted artificial thought so that it can be taken away from the earth before its destruction. What we call the body is the site or placeholder of a certain inseparability of thinking and suffering. This suffering is not a symptom written into the spirit; it does not happen or impose itself from without. The pain is itself thinking – pain conceived, that is, as inclusive of the boring probing that gets written off as boredom. To think is to remain open to an imperative that is not yet known. And that is a pain. Why, it's even really boring. 'She' asks, Will your imagining and thinking machines suffer too? What can the future mean to them, since they consist only of memory. 'She' continues. That's not the point you might counter – as long as the machines can realize the paradoxical relationship to the so-called data which are not given but which can only be given. The opening, the empty place or clearing that is there in the midst of the completed inscriptions must be created, over and over again. This hurts because the not yet thought carves its opening where it was already secretly etched between or behind inscribed lines that harbour and attend what is in effect the reopening of a wound. The memories of the machines should be able to feel this pain of the not-thought, the not-inscribed that still remains to be inscribed. Their rewinding must be a rewounding, too. How else could these machines otherwise begin to think? We need machines that suffer from the being-stored, the storedom, of their many memories.

Suffer not the little children to come unto this future. Forget reproduction. Remember or reconstitute instead inside our technofuture the sexual difference that cuts across suffering thinking, and that proves inseparable from it. ‘She’ concludes: this other sexual difference, not the one that is measured on one’s own person or released but contained in couple formation, must be programmed inside the separation from body and earth that takes off with the merger with technology. If we are to survive body and earth via technology, then sexual difference or self difference would have to get into our programs. The wound of take-off cannot be left behind in our wondrous flight into tech-no-body futures. Otherwise only our fantasies about and projections of ourselves as units and self-unities would be along for the ride, for the suicide.

#### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Moshe Idel, *Golem: Jewish Magical and Mystical Traditions on the Artificial Anthropoid*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990); Gershom Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Schocken Books, 1997 [1960]).
- <sup>2</sup> Norbert Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc. – A Comment on Certain Points Where Cybernetics Impinges on Religion*, (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1964).
- <sup>3</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.73.
- <sup>4</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.36.
- <sup>5</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.47.
- <sup>6</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, pp.49–50.
- <sup>7</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.15.
- <sup>8</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.17.
- <sup>9</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.52.
- <sup>10</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.59.
- <sup>11</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.62.
- <sup>12</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.63.
- <sup>13</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.63.
- <sup>14</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.64.
- <sup>15</sup> Wiener, *God and Golem, Inc.*, p.69.
- <sup>16</sup> Alan Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, in *Mind. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy*, 59, 236 (October 1950), pp.433–460.
- <sup>17</sup> Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, p.453.
- <sup>18</sup> Arthur C. Clarke, *Childhood’s End*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990 [1953]).
- <sup>19</sup> Clarke, *Childhood’s End*, p.182.
- <sup>20</sup> Arthur C. Clarke, ‘The Sentinel’, in [Series Ed] Martin Scorsese, *The Making of ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’*, (New York: The Modern Library, 2000) pp.17–26.
- <sup>21</sup> Clarke, ‘The Sentinel’, p.24.
- <sup>22</sup> Gene Youngblood, ‘Free Press Interview: Arthur C. Clarke’, in [Series Ed] Martin Scorsese, *The Making of ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’*, (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), pp.258–269, p.261.
- <sup>23</sup> Clarke, ‘The Sentinel’, pp.25–26.
- <sup>24</sup> Clarke, *Childhood’s End*, pp.202–203.
- <sup>25</sup> Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in [Ed] James Strachey, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XVIII, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953–1974).
- <sup>26</sup> Aleister Crowley, *The Confessions of Aleister Crowley. An Autohagiography*, [Eds] John Symonds and Kenneth Grant, (London: Penguin Arkana, 1989).
- <sup>27</sup> Clarke, *Childhood’s End*, p.186.
- <sup>28</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Can Thought Go On without a Body?’ in *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
- <sup>29</sup> Lyotard, ‘Can Thought Go On without a Body?’, p.9. (translation amended).
- <sup>30</sup> Lyotard, ‘Can Thought Go On without a Body?’, p.11. (translation amended).

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