CS 4803
Computer and Network Security

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Hard problems for public-key crypto.
Discrete log.

- As no encryption scheme besides the OneTimePad is unconditionally secure, we need to find some building blocks - hard problems (assumptions about hardness of some problems) to base security of our new encryption schemes on.
- Block ciphers and their PRF security is not an option since now we don't have shared keys in the public-key (asymmetric-key) setting.
- Let's consider the discrete log related problems and the RSA problem.

Discrete-log related problems

- Let **G** be a cyclic group and let m = |**G**|. The discrete logarithm function $\mathrm{DLog}_{\mathbf{G},g}(a)$: **G** → $\mathbf{Z_m}$ takes a ∈ **G** and returns i ∈ $\mathbf{Z_m}$ such that $g^i = a$.
- There are several computational problems related to this function:
  - Discrete-logarithm (DL) problem
  - Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem
  - Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem

Problem	**Given**	**Figure out**
Discrete logarithm (DL)	g^x	x
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)	g^x, g^y	g^{xy}
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)	g^x, g^y, g^z	Is $z \equiv xy \pmod{\lvert G\rvert}$?

DL problem

- <u>Def</u>. Let **G** be a cyclic group and let m = |**G**|. Let g be a generator. Consider the following experiment associated with an adversary A.
- Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\mathrm{dl}}_{G,g}(A)$
  $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$; $X \leftarrow g^x$
- $\overline{x} \leftarrow A(X)$
  If $g^{\overline{x}} = X$ then return 1 else return 0
- The dl-advantage of A is defined as the probability of the above experiment outputting 1.
- The discrete logarithm problem is said to be hard in **G** if the dl-advantage of any adversary with reasonable resources is small.

CDH

- Def. Let **G** be a cyclic group of order m. Let g be a generator. Consider the following experiment associated with an adversary A.
- Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\mathrm{cdh}}_{G,g}(A)$
  $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$; $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$
- $X \leftarrow g^x$; $Y \leftarrow g^y$
  $Z \leftarrow A(X, Y)$
- If $Z = g^{xy}$ then return 1 else return 0
- The cdh-advantage of A is defined as the probability of the above experiment outputting 1.
- The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is said to be hard in **G** if the cdh-advantage of any adversary with reasonable resources is small.

DDH

- Def. Let **G** be a cyclic group of order m. Let g be a generator. Consider the following experiments associated with an adversary A.

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\mathrm{ddh\text{-}1}}_{G,g}(A)$	Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\mathrm{ddh\text{-}0}}_{G,g}(A)$
$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$	$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$
$y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$	$y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$
$z \leftarrow xy \bmod m$	$z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{Z}_m$
$X \leftarrow g^x$; $Y \leftarrow g^y$; $Z \leftarrow g^z$	$X \leftarrow g^x$; $Y \leftarrow g^y$; $Z \leftarrow g^z$
$d \leftarrow A(X, Y, Z)$	$d \leftarrow A(X, Y, Z)$
Return d	Return d

- The ddh-advantage of A is defined as the difference between probabilities of outputting 0 in two experiments.
- The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is said to be hard in **G** if the ddh-advantage of any adversary with reasonable resources is small.

Relations between problems

- Fix a group and a generator

Can solve DL ⇒ Can solve CDH ⇒ Can solve DDH

DDH is hard ⇒ CDH is hard ⇒ DL is hard

- Hardness of the problems depends on the choice of a group.

- For most groups there is an algorithm that solves the DL problem in $O(|G|^{1/2})$
- Let's consider $\mathbf{G}=\mathbf{Z}_p^*$ for a prime p.
  - Claim. [DDH is easy]. Let $p \geq 3$ be a prime, let $\mathbf{G}=\mathbf{Z}_p^*$, and let g be a generator of **G**. Then there is an adversary A, with running time $O(|p|^3)$ and ddh-advantage 1/2.

- Proof. The idea is to compute and analyze the Legendre symbols of the inputs.

Adversary (X,Y,Z)

Return 1 if (Z and (X or Y) are squares) //(by computing the Legendre symbols of X,Y,Z)

or (Z and X and Y are non-squares)

- We claim that

$$\Pr\left[\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{ddh-1}}_{G,g}(A)=1\right] = 1$$
$$\Pr\left[\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{ddh-0}}_{G,g}(A)=1\right] = \frac{1}{2}$$

//see the related facts

subtracting and noting that computing the Legendre symbol takes cubic time in |p| (computed via exponentiation) we get the statement.

- The best algorithm to solve the CDH problem in $\mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{*}$ is (seems to be) by solving the DL problem.
- The (seemingly) best algorithm to solve the DL problem is the GNFS (General Number Field Sieve) that runs
- $$O(e^{(C+o(1))\cdot\ln(p)^{1/3}\cdot(\ln\ln(p))^{2/3}})$$
-

where C ≈1.92.

If the prime factorization of order of the group is known:

$p-1=p_1^{\alpha_1}\cdots p_n^{\alpha_n}$, the the DL problem can be solved in time in the order of $\sum_{i=1}^{n}\alpha_i\cdot(\sqrt{p_i}+|p|)$

- Thus if we want the DL problem to be hard, then at least one prime factor needs to be large. E.g. p=2q+1, where q is a large prime.

- We often want the DDH problem to be hard.
- The DDH problem is believed to be hard in several groups, e.g.
  - QR($\mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{*}$) -the subgroup of quadratic residues of $\mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{*}$ where p=2q+1, p,q, are primes. It’s a cyclic group of prime order.