Extracting Rights and Obligations to Align Requirements with Regulations

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Abstract. In the United States, federal and state regulations prescribe stakeholder rights and obligations that must be satisfied by the requirements for software systems. These regulations are typically wrought with ambiguities, making the process of deriving system requirements ad hoc and error prone. In highly regulated domains such as healthcare, there is a need for more comprehensive standards that can be used to assure that system requirements conform to regulations. To address this need, we expound upon a process called Semantic Parameterization previously used to derive rights and obligations from privacy goals. In this work, we apply the process to the Privacy Rule from the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). We present our methodology for extracting and prioritizing rights and obligations from regulations and show how semantic models can be used to clarify ambiguities through focused elicitation and to balance rights with obligations. The results of our analysis can aid requirements engineers, standards organizations, compliance officers, and stakeholders in assuring systems conform to policy and satisfy requirements.

1. Introduction

Healthcare information systems are becoming ubiquitous and thus increasingly subject to attack, misuse and abuse. Specifications and designs often neglect security and privacy concerns [1]. Moreover, regulations such as the HIPAA [13] – as well as security and privacy policies – are difficult for users to understand and complex for software engineers to use as a guide for designing and implementing systems. Mechanisms are needed to help analysts disambiguate regulations so that they may be clearly specified as software requirements, in order to ensure that these systems conform to policy.

Policies assign different stakeholders various rights, such as the right to refrain from disclosing information, the right to use information freely for a specified purpose, etc. A *right* is a relational claim legitimately ascribed to a *right bearer* with respect to an implicit or explicit other, the *counterparty*. To say that a party has a right is a way of talking about the counterparty's implied obligation. For example, if a

healthcare patient has a right to access their health records, then their physician's office has an obligation to provide access. An *obligation* is a duty bound to an *obligated party* that must be complied with, often accompanied with a penalty for non-compliance. Obligations, like goals [2, 21], can be operationalized into requirements. Reformulating rights in terms of the implied rights and obligations of counterparties will enable requirements engineers to specify requirements in terms of stakeholder commitments and question their legitimacy to achieve regulatory compliance.

It is estimated that healthcare organizations will spend \$17.6 billion over the next few years to bring their systems and procedures into compliance with HIPAA [22]. Existing guidelines and standards not only fail to provide specific solutions, but also make compliance a significant challenge. According to a 2005 Ernst & Young survey of executives in over 1,300 international organizations, compliance with regulations and policy surpassed worms and viruses as the primary driver of information security policy in 2005 [9]. The consequence of not complying with regulations is now forefront for those responsible for assuring that software systems containing sensitive information remain secure and protected.

Current work mostly focuses on retooling and developing systems to comply with HIPAA by capturing and processing the meta-data that must now be maintained and accounted for. From a developer's perspective, the first challenge is to interpret and define system requirements, given HIPAA's legal language. The need for such interpretation is not unique to HIPAA, but is particularly difficult in this case because collaborating organizations are performing their own HIPAA interpretations. The costs of error are great. Serious civil and criminal penalties are associated with misinterpretations: the risk of such misinterpretations increases with the interoperation of separate systems. A survey of different requirements frameworks reveals that none are well suited to deal with the relationships and obligations specified in the HIPAA [1].

To address this problem, we show how a process called Semantic Parameterization [3, 4] was combined with an extended methodology and applied to the HIPAA Privacy Rule [17] to derive rights and obligations. We provide strategies to identify and resolve ambiguities, express exceptions, and balance rights with obligations. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and defines the key terminology and notation. Section 3 provides an overview of the relevant aspects of the semantic parameterization process as it relates to the analysis of regulatory texts. Section 4 discusses our efforts to validate our extensions to semantic parameterization within the context of the HIPAA. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the contributions and limitations of this work and our plans for future work.

2. Background and Terminology

2.1 Related Work

Several researchers derive logical models from regulations and law without a specific focus on requirements engineering [6, 19, 26, 25]. In these approaches domain experts with logic programming skills model regulations. We acknowledge the value of formal methods and ultimately seek to integrate with approaches that include consistency and model checking; herein, however, we prioritize developing a standard process to extract and represent formal models. Despite this difference, these two approaches do complement each other with regards to the challenges in modeling regulations as we now discuss.

Bench-Capon et al. and Kowalski illustrate how to use negation to handle exceptions in regulation statements [6, 18]. In addition to negation, we allow some rights and obligations that are exceptions to have priority over other rights and obligations (see Section 4.2). Bench-Capon et al. also discuss the difficulty with interpreting cross-references in regulations [6]. Cross-references can refer to sets of performances (e.g., disclosures, notifications) from entire subsections, requiring an analyst to extract relevant material across multiple contexts. For this reason, we prefer prioritization to avoid the potential pitfalls of cross-context interpretation.

Kerrigan and Law describe a system that models environmental regulations using first-order predicate logic [19]. The system computes weighted relatedness scores between sections of regulation text using ontologies. We recognize a need to compare regulations at the finer statement-level to compare individual rights, obligations and constraints. To accomplish this aim, we show how queries over semantic models from our prior work [4] are used to partially order individual rights and obligations based on their level of refinement (see Section 4.3).

Normative theory investigates the relationships between permissions (rights) and obligations. Horty has shown that Deontic logic and reasoning must distinguish between what an agent "ought to do" and "ought to be" [15, 16]. Boella and van der Torre considers the relationship between permissions and obligations [7]: notably, are permissions simply the absence of obligatory restrictions and do permission presuppose balanced obligations? In Section 4.5, we begin systematically answering these questions in the context of specific regulations by showing how an approach to balance rights and obligations provides a means to investigate *implied* rights and obligations.

In requirements engineering, Darke and Shanks provide a conceptual framework to discuss viewpoints with regard to requirements coverage [8]. Proposed frameworks facilitate elicitation [27], integrate viewpoints [23] and identify inconsistencies [10]. Herein, different stakeholders viewpoints are embedded in rights and obligations that can be balanced to expose implied rights and obligations for other stakeholders (see Section 4.5).

Giorgini et al. present Secure Tropos (ST), a formal framework to model security requirements applied to Italian privacy legislation [12]. ST distinguishes permissions (at-most) and obligations (at-least) in the context of delegation. ST employs Datalog to enable model checking necessary to find inconsistencies. Our work complements their framework by providing a standard process to extract permissions (rights) and obligations from regulations and law.

2.2 Terminology and Notation

We define the following key terms:

- A *stakeholder* is an entity afforded rights and/or obligations by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
- A *right* is an action that a stakeholder is conditionally permitted to perform.
- An *obligation* is an action that a stakeholder is conditionally required to perform.
- A *delegation* is a right or obligation that a policy or stakeholder assigns to another stakeholder.
- A *rule statement* is the regulation text that includes the right or obligation and any constraints.
- A *constraint phrase* is the part of a rule statement that describes a single pre-condition.
- A *normative phrase* contains words that indicate what "ought to be" as rights or obligations.

Notation Used: the semantic models that appear in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 are expressed in the Knowledge Transformation Language (KTL) from prior work [4]. Symbols in the language have only one part-of-speech form: nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs; articles and prepositions are not allowed. Symbols prefixed by question marks are treated as wildcards. Symbols prefixed by exclamation marks are negated. Expressions support two types of anti-reflexive and asymmetric relations: 1) *delta* relations x[y] or y=x,

which both read "x is y" and 2) *alpha* relations $x{y}$ or y:x which read "x has y" and "y of x," respectively.

3. Methodology for Analyzing Regulations

In this study, we adopt a process called Semantic Parameterization, in which rights and obligations from regulation texts are restated into restricted natural language statements (RNLS), to describe discrete activities [3, 4]. RNLS(s) are mapped into semantic models that are amenable to formal analysis [3, 4]. Semantic Parameterization was developed using Grounded Theory, in which theory that is systematically obtained from a dataset is valid for that dataset [11]. To date, we have applied Semantic Parameterization to three datasets: (1) the 100 most frequently-occurring semi-structured goals mined from over 100 privacy policies [3, 4]; (2) a pilot study analyzing unstructured text from a fact sheet [14] that summarizes the HIPAA Privacy Rule [17], yielding 15 rights and 19 obligations [5]; and (3) this case study in which we analyzed the unstructured regulation text from the Privacy Rule to yield 46 rights and 80 obligations. After each study, we generalize the parameterization process by reconciling the existing theory to overcome new limitations.

As in previous studies [3, 4], we employ a two-phase methodology. In the first phase, we manually extract rule statements using only three RNLS patterns to separate the right or obligation phrase(s) from relevant constraint phrase(s). The activity patterns are: 1) activities with a subject who performs some action on an object; 2) activities that further distinguish subjects and objects by providing additional information [3, 4]; and 3) activities following condition keywords (if, unless, except) identified in an earlier pilot study [5]. Separated constraint phrase(s) are used to construct pre-conditions in the form of logical expressions. In the second phase, we derive semantic models from right, obligation and constraint statements using the activity patterns, as necessary. Because the second phase is described in prior work [3, 4], its details are beyond the scope of this paper. We now illustrate the first phase by example.

Consider the unrestricted natural language statement UNLS₁ summarized from §164.522(a)(1)(iii) in the Privacy Rule and parameterized as RNLS(s):

UNLS₁: A covered entity that agrees to a restriction may not use or disclose protected health information, except if the individual who requested the restriction is in need of emergency treatment.

RNLS₁: The covered entity who (RNLS2) may not disclose protected health information, except if (RNLS₃). RNLS₂:

- The covered entity agrees to a restriction.
- RNLS₃: The individual who (RNLS₄) needs emergency treatment.
- RNLS₄: The individual requests the restriction.

To extract rights and obligations, we first identify the normative phrase that defines what stakeholders are permitted or required to do. In UNLS₁, the normative phrase "may not" indicates an obligation and will appear in the first RNLS and obligation statement (RNLS₁). By extracting rights and obligations exclusively using normative phrases, the analyst's attention remains focused on expressed as opposed to implied rights and obligations. As we show in Section 4.5, implied rights and obligations are systematically obtained by balancing semantic models derived from expressed rights and obligations.

Each RNLS is restricted to one discrete state or activity and permits only one verb; however, UNLS₁ has two verbs, use and disclose, and describes two obligations may not use and may not disclose. In general, if the statement has a logical disjunction in the subject or verb phrases, we separate the statement into pair-wise distinct rights or obligations. English conjunctions (and, or) are not always equivalent to logical-and and logical-or. The analyst must decide whether the entities in an English conjunction are dependent (logical-and) or independent (logical-or) of one another when restating them in an RNLS.

RNLS(s) are separate constraints on a right or obligation if they distinguish subjects and objects (e.g., RNLS₂, RNLS₄) or follow condition words (e.g., $RNLS_3$). Consider $RNLS_1$ that distinguishes the covered entity using the nested RNLS₂ whereas RNLS₃ distinguishes the *individual* using the nested RNLS₄. In addition, the condition keywords except if in RNLS₁ are followed by the nested RNLS₃. We do not classify other RNLS(s) such as transitive verbs followed by verb phrases, instruments or purposes [3, 4] as separate constraints. Rather, these phrases remain nested in the right, obligation or constraint statement for this study.

The content in the regulation texts is highly segregated and indexed by stakeholder and process. To maintain traceability, an index from the original subsection in the regulation text is mapped to each right, obligation and constraint statements. Finally, the constraints are organized into a logical expression based on a simple heuristic: two constraints are in a disjunction only if they are independent when invoking the rule, otherwise they are in a conjunction. The four RNLS(s) are indexed and organized as follows:

Constraints:

- C1: The covered entity agrees to a restriction. 164.522 (a)(1)(iii)
- The individual needs emergency medical treatment. C2: 164.522 (a)(1)(iii)
- C3: The individual requests a restriction. 164.522 (a)(1)(iii)



Obligation:

The constraints C_1 , C_2 , and C_3 are extracted from RNLS₂, RNLS₃ and RNLS₄, respectively. The obligation and each constraint are from the same subsection and are indexed accordingly. The obligation is labeled with constraints C_1 , C_2 , and C_3 in a logical conjunction in square brackets. Because RNLS₃ was part of an exception (e.g., *except if*), we negate the corresponding constraint C_2 in the conjunction. We further discuss integrating exceptions in Section 4.2.


Regulation texts tend to be laden with crossreferences to different regulation sections. Analysts must follow each cross-reference to evaluate the impact of the referenced content on each right or obligation statement. Requirements engineers can use the indices to help maintain traceability as constraints are incorporated from different sections.

4. Analyzing Healthcare Regulations

To address the need for methodologies that aid in designing trustworthy healthcare systems that conform to policy and regulations, we applied our methodology to the HIPAA Privacy Rule [17]. The Rule is a regulation governing healthcare privacy in the U.S., including the provision and enforcement of privacy policies. Based on our discussions with Chief Security (CSO), Chief Information Security (CISO) and Chief Privacy Officers (CPO), organizations tend to assign priority to complying with those regulations most likely to interface with their beneficiaries, consumers and the public. For this reason, we focused on the following four sections in the Rule:

- **§164.520**: Notice of privacy practices for protected health information.
- **§164.522:** Rights to request privacy protection for protected health information.
- **§164.524:** Access of individuals to protected health information.
- **§164.526:** Amendment of protected health information.

The Rule is comprised of two parts, Parts 160 and 164, and contains a total of 33,500 words. The four sections we analyzed (listed above) contain a total of 5,978 words or 17.8% of the Rule. Each Part is subdivided into subparts and each subpart is further divided into sections. Sections §160.103, §164.500, and §164.501 contain definitions that distinguish the entities governed by the Rule. From these definitions, stakeholders can be organized into a class hierarchy. The class hierarchy in Figure 1 shows the stakeholders from the four analyzed sections. The arrows in the hierarchy point towards super-classes; for example, group health plans (GHP) and health insurance issuer (HII) are both sub-types of health plans (HP), and an HP is a sub-type of a covered entity (CE).





Each Rule section is divided into sub-sections that contain standards and implementation specifications, often with a separate emphasis on unique stakeholders. All of the sub-sections we analyzed were deemed to contain potential system requirements. The sub-sections are also sub-divided in ways that balance between conciseness and readability. Below, we summarize text from \$164.520(c)(2) and (c)(3) as a model standard we simply index as (a) to illustrate the effect of applying the methodology to the regulation text. The normative phrase (must) and condition words (if, unless) are **bold**, the constraint phrases are <u>underlined</u> and the obligation phrases are *italicized*.

- (a) Standard: *The covered entity* **must** provide the *individual notice.*
 - (1) A covered entity who has a direct treatment relationship with an individual must ...
 (A) Provide notice no later than the first
 - (B) If the covered entity maintains a physical
 - <u>delivery site</u>: *i. Have the notice available for*
 - individuals to take.
 - *ii.* Post the notice in a clear and prominent location.
 - (2) For the purposes of paragraph (a)(1), a covered entity who delivers service electronically, must provide electronic notice unless the individual requests to receive a paper notice.

Applying our methodology, we derive constraints C_4-C_8 and obligations O_1-O_4 , below. Because each phrase in each statement must be attributed to an extracted element, at a minimum our systematic approach provides statement-level requirements coverage for an entire document. The *italicized* phrases in obligations O_2 , O_4 , and O_5 are ambiguities resolved using the regulation text. Indices from the summarized text above appear in parenthesis after constraint and obligation statements; the constraint indices below appear in logical expressions in square brackets following the obligation statements.



Constraints:

- $\ensuremath{\textbf{C_4:}}$ The CE has a direct treatment relationship with the individual. (a)(1)
- $\textbf{C_5:}$ The notice is provided no later than the first service delivery. (a)(1)(A)
- **C**₆: The CE maintains a physical delivery site. (a)(1)(B)
- **C₇:** The CE delivers service electronically. (a)(2)
- ${\pmb C}_{\pmb 8}{\pmb :}$ The individual requests to receive a paper notice. (a)(2)

Obligations:

- **O₂:** The CE must provide notice to the individual (a).
- $\textbf{O_4:}$ The CE must have the notice available for individuals to take. (a)(1)(B)(i) $[C_4 \wedge C_6]$
- $\textbf{O_5:}$ The CE must post the notice in a clear and prominent location for the individual to read. (a)(1)(B)(ii) [C_4 \land C_6]
- **O**₆: The CE must provide electronic notice *to the individual.* (a)(2) $[C_4 \land C_5 \land C_7 \land \neg C_8]$

Right, obligation and constraint statements are often distributed across several sub-sections in the Rule. For example, the subject *CE* is specified in subsection (a)(1); however, the obligation phrases *provide notice*, *have notice available*, and *post the notice* each appear in separate sub-sections (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(*i*), and (a)(1)(B)(*ii*), respectively. The constraint C_4 appearing in sub-section (a)(1) is applied across each of these obligations and the obligation in sub-section (a)(2) due to a cross-reference back to (a)(1). Crossreferences to other Rule sections pose the greatest challenge to analysts, since each section is written from a different viewpoint; this makes the relevance of constraints from other sections subtle and uncertain.

The remainder of Section 4 is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides summary results from applying the methodology; Section 4.2 presents two types of exceptions found in our analysis and strategies to address them; Section 4.3 illustrates the need to compare rights and obligations and our approach to address this need; Section 4.4 shows how semantic models are used to identify ambiguities in rights and obligations; and Section 4.5 shows how semantic models are used to balance rights with obligations.

4.1. Analysis Results from HIPAA

We identified 46 rights and 79 obligations in §164.520–§164.526. This effort required 42 personhours analyzing the four sections and developing the theory for rights and obligations; nine person-hours were spent applying the methodology to all four sections §164.520-526. The 42-hour effort was characterized by contentious discussion and frustration due to the lack of a framework upon which to base our discussions. In contrast, the nine-hour effort yielded a consistent understanding of the rights and obligations codified in the regulation. Thus, we believe the gain in understanding justifies the effort in applying the methodology. While the three analysts are experienced requirements engineers, we don't believe our methodology requires significant training; we plan to empirically validate this in the future.

Table 1 summarizes the total number of rights (\mathbf{R}) , obligations (\mathbf{O}) , constraints (\mathbf{C}) and cross-references (\mathbf{CR}) identified per section. From a requirements

Table 1: Number of Rights, Obligations, and Constraints in HIPAA §164.520–§164.526

Section	R	0	С	CR
164.520	9	17	54	37
164.522	7	19	19	9
164.524	20	26	67	29
164.526	10	18	42	23

engineering perspective, each constraint in the scope of the system must be satisfied by corresponding functionality in system design. Because each constraint corresponds to a system state or event that must be accounted for, a larger number of constraints may increase the complexity of governed systems. In contrast, because cross-references require engineers to trace concepts across different contexts, which are often confusing, a high number of cross-references may decrease requirements accuracy.

Table 2 summarizes the total occurrences of unique normative phrases (N) we identified as well as the modality. *Anti-rights* refer to activities the regulation

Table 2: Normative Phrases in HIPAA Sections §164.520–§164.526

Phrase	N	Modality
does not have a right to	1	Anti-Right
has a right to	7	Right
is not required to	3	Anti-Obligation
may	16	Right
may deny*	3	Right
may not	2	Obligation
may not require*	1	Obligation
may require*	4	Right
must	39	Obligation
must deny*	1	Obligation
must permit*	13	Obligation
must request*	1	Obligation
retains the right to	1	Right

explicitly exempts from stakeholder rights, but does not require the stakeholder to avoid (e.g., does not have a right to). Similarly, *anti-obligations* are activities that the regulation explicitly exempts from stakeholder obligations, but does not require the stakeholder to avoid (e.g., is not required to). We distinguish both anti-rights and anti-obligations from activities that are disallowed, such as obligations using the phrase "may not." Also in Table 2, normative phrases with an



asterisk (*) indicate rights and obligations assigned through delegation. In delegation, a stakeholder is permitted or required to assign other stakeholders specific rights and obligations. The list of phrases in Table 2 is complete for the four analyzed HIPAA sections; we expect there to be other phrases in the HIPAA sections remaining to be analyzed. It is important to either attribute each phrase to a single modality or to document ambiguous phrases. Consider that the phrase "may" conveys a right and "may not," conveys an obligation. Specifying the modality enables us to ensure consistency in applying our methodology.

4.2. Prioritizing and Reconciling Exceptions

When extracting rights and obligations, the analyst must occasionally address an exception to a right or obligation. We identified 12 exceptions, each of which follows a special condition keyword (e.g., *except*, *if not*, *unless*). We address each exception in one of two ways: 1) increasing the priority of rights or obligations that were exceptions such that rights or obligations with higher priorities will exclusively overrule rights or obligations of lower priority; or 2) by applying DeMorgan's Law to the constraints in an exception.

We now examine each approach by example, first consider rights $R_{520.1}$ and $R_{520.4}$ from §164.520:

R_{520.1}: An individual **has the right to** adequate notice from the CE of the uses and disclosures of PHI (a)(1).

R_{520.4}: An inmate **does not have a right to** notice (a)(3) from the CE of the uses and disclosures of PHI (a)(1).

In Section (a)(3) of the Rule, the phrase "exception for inmates" precedes the original rule statement used to derive $R_{520.4}$. In addition, the reference "under this section" denotes that the exception applies to all of §164.520. As a consequence, we increase the priority of $R_{520.4}$ over $R_{520.1}$ and any other rights from this section to ensure that inmates do not inadvertently receive rights the law did not intend them to have. In addition, four other exceptions were handled by increasing the priority of the rights or obligations.

The second type of exception applies to constraints for a single right or obligation. In two cases, we identified exceptions that apply to a conjunction and disjunction of constraints. Consider the UNLS₂ summarized from $\S164.524$, Section (a)(1):

UNLS₂: The individual has a right to access their PHI that is maintained in a designated record set (DRS), except for: (i) Psychotherapy notes; or (ii) PHI compiled for a legal proceeding; ...

For a single constraint we only need to negate the exception and *logically-and* it to the constraint set for the right or obligation. However, given a set of constraints, the negation must be distributed over the set while observing DeMorgan's Law before we

logically-and the result to the constraint set. Consider the constraints and right derived from UNLS₂:

Constraints:

C₉: The PHI is maintained in a DRS. (a)(1).

 C_{10} : The PHI is psychotherapy notes. (a)(1)(i)

C₁₁: The PHI is compiled for a legal proceeding. (a)(1)(ii) **Right:**

R_1: The individual may access their PHI. (a)(1) [C_9 \land $\neg C_{10} \land \neg C_{11}]$

We conclude the exception is $\neg(C_{I0} \lor C_{I1})$ and, after applying DeMorgan's Law, $(\neg C_{I0} \land \neg C_{I1})$. We identified five exceptions where single constraints were only negated to integrate them.

4.3. Comparing Rights and Obligations

The Privacy Rule groups rights and obligations with a shared context together in the same section. While these rights and obligations are related, they may describe different actors, means of implementation, or reasons for which the regulation is intended. Consider the extracted obligations $O_{520.4}$, $O_{520.7}$ and $O_{520.8}$ from §164.520, below:

O_{520.4}: The GHP **is not required** to provide notice to any person (a)(2)(*iii*).

- **O**_{520.7}: The CE **must** provide the notice to any person or individual (c).
- **O**_{520.8}: The HP **must** provide the notice (c)(1)(i) to any person or individual (c).

Obligations $O_{520.4}$, $O_{520.7}$ and $O_{520.8}$ describe the obligations of the GHP, CE and HP, respectively, to provide notice to an individual. Recall from the stakeholder class hierarchy (Figure 1) that these actors have class relationships, such that a GHP is a type of HP and an HP is a type of CE. From these obligations, an HP who must satisfy two obligations may exist: first as an HP ($O_{520.8}$) and secondly as a CE ($O_{520.7}$). Also, a potential conflict exists since a GHP may not need to satisfy either obligation $O_{520.7}$ or $O_{520.8}$.

Fortunately, the semantic models derived from rights and obligations are comparable using queries [4]. Queries establish a partial order on semantic models sufficient to group rights or obligations that affect a single stakeholder at different levels of abstraction. To demonstrate, we modified our query algorithm to accommodate the stakeholder class hierarchy. Furthermore, we introduce *person* as a super-class for individual and inmate. In addition to obligations $O_{520.4}$, $O_{520.7}$ and $O_{520.8}$, consider the following obligations from §164.520 in the Rule:

- **O**_{520.2}: The GHP **must** provide notice to any person (a)(2)(*ii*)(B).
- **O**_{520.10}: The HCP **must** (c)(2) provide notice (c)(2)(*i*) to the individual (c).
- **O**_{520.13}: The CE **must** provide electronic notice to the individual (c)(3)(i).
- **O**_{520.14}: The CE **must** provide a paper copy of the notice to the individual (c)(3)(*ii*).



O_{520.15}: The HCP **must** automatically provide electronic notice to the individual (c)(3)(*iii*).

Each obligation has the same general requirement: the stakeholder must provide notice to a person. Applying the modified query algorithm generated the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 2, in which arrows point to generalizations and dotted lines represent conflicts:




Figure 2: Obligation Class Hierarchy

Obligation $O_{520.7}$ is the most abstract obligation in the hierarchy – we call this the *least-constrained form* (LCF). The LCF is generated from the minimally required model attributes for a right or obligation: the subject, action and object (required by the activity pattern) and the normative phrase (required by the methodology). Obligation O_{520.15} combines attributes from O_{520,10} and O_{520,13}: specifically, the notice must be electronic and provisioned by the HCP. Compare this refinement to obligation O_{520.14} that governs provisions of paper notices. The obligation $O_{520.4}$ conflicts with O_{520.2}, denoted by the dotted line, which defines the situations when a GHP is not required to provide notice to individuals. Queries provide limited support to detect conflicts (e.g., obligations O_{520.2} and O_{520.4}). Only those conflicts resulting from negation on typesimilar model symbols (e.g., right and not right; CE and not HCP) are both detectable. Constraints are comparable in the same manner using queries.

4.4. Resolving Ambiguities

We have observed two types of ambiguities in the Privacy Rule thus far: (1) English conjunctions and (2) under-specifications. English conjunctions are potentially (and frequently) ambiguous. Consider the following obligation from §164.522 in the Rule:

O_{522.5}: The CE must document in writing **or** electronically any request **and** agreement to a restriction on the use **or** disclosure of PHI (a)(3).

In O_{522.5}, there are three (bolded) English conjunctions. We interpret these as *exclusive-or*, *logical-and*, and *logical-or*, in order of appearance. We assume the CE does not need to document both "in writing" and "electronically": this alternative would be *logical-or*, not *exclusive-or*, as we propose.

Furthermore, we assume the CE is only required to document requests for restrictions to which they agree. An alternative interpretation is *logical-or* that increases the documentation quantity produced by corresponding requirements. Clearly, alternate interpretations are biased by the stakeholder goals. For example, the covered entity needs to reduce cost and workload, the auditor needs information to review practices, and individuals need to add and remove restrictions.

Due to under-specifications in the Rule, one risks losing important contextual information distributed across multiple statements while extracting rights and obligations. Analysts can leverage the correspondence between RNLS(s) and semantic models to identify missing information or clarify ambiguities. We highlight two frequent types of ambiguity observed in this study: missing co-requisite attributes and verb phrases masquerading as nouns. We discuss each of these in detail using right $R_{524.4}$ from §164.524 below:

 $R_{524,4}$: The individual $has \ a \ right \ to$ have a denial reviewed. 164.524(a)(3)

The activity pattern is frequently used in semantic models [4] and has three co-requisite attributes: *subject, action* and *object*. If the subject or object is well-defined within the broader context of the regulation text, some phrases will omit one or both. For example, the subject of phrases describing the *purpose* is typically omitted. In Figure 3, the semantic model for $R_{524.4}$ is shown using the activity pattern to describe the right of the individual (Line 1).

1	activity [right : individual] {
2	subject = ?someone
3	action = review
4	object = denial
5	}

Figure 3: Ambiguous Activity Pattern

The context from which $R_{524.4}$ was extracted states the reviewer of denials is an LHP designated by the CE; however, because the methodology is statementdriven, $R_{524.4}$ was extracted without a proper *subject* attribute (Line 2). The activity pattern requires a *subject*, thus this ambiguity is automatically identified using queries to check for missing subjects, actions and objects [4]. In addition, specific verbs have co-requisite attributes. For example, the verb *disclose* has a *target* or *recipient* of the disclosure and the verb *use* has a *purpose* for which an *object* is used [4].

Another frequent ambiguity occurs when verb phrases masquerade as nouns. Specific activities that are elaborated in verb phrases can be summarized by a single noun; English gerunds are one example, often observed in purposes. For example, the *denial* in R_{524.4} modeled on Line 4 in Figure 3 can be elaborated by the verb phrase "to deny..." The broader context reveals



that the *denial* refers to the "CE denies access" where *access* describes the "individual's access to PHI." Figure 4 shows how to expand these nouns into separate activities: the *denial* (Line 4) and the *access* (Line 7). In addition, we elicit the required *subject*, *action*, and *object* attributes for each new activity.

```
1
     activity [ right : individual ] {
2
          subject = LHP
3
          action = review
4
          object = denial {
               subject = CE
5
6
               action = denv
7
               object = access {
8
                    subject = individual
9
                    action = access
10
                    object = PHI
11
               3
12
          }
13
     }
```

Figure 4: Verb Phrases Masquerade as Nouns

By maintaining a separate list of nouns and their verb counterparts, these ambiguities are automatically identified by our tool and partially resolved in the model; for example, if the noun "treatment" is detected, then treatment is automatically translated into an activity with the verb "treat" assigned to the action. However, values assigned to the subjects and objects must be manually acquired from the regulation text. Because there are different values that can be assigned to subjects and objects, the detection automated by the tool helps analysts save time and systematically resolve the detected ambiguities. The tool identified the following missing co-requisite attributes in semantic models from all four sections: 28 subjects, 8 actions, and 21 objects, in addition to 27 sources and 37 targets that are required for some verbs.

4.5. Balancing Rights and Obligations

Balancing rights and obligations is the process to derive implied rights and obligations for one stakeholder from the expressed rights or obligations of another stakeholder. The balancing process increases requirements coverage, since obligations derived from rights - either implied or expressed - may be operationalized as requirements. As a matter of jurisprudence, we see two views on balancing rights and obligations: in the conservative view, an expressed right or obligation does not imply rights or obligations for other stakeholders; in the liberal view, each expressed right or obligation must be analyzed to yield all possible implied rights or obligations for other stakeholders. We employ the liberal view as matter of demonstration and leave it to the politics of the situation to decide which view is most appropriate. We discuss balancing rights and obligations for two stakeholder interactions including *delegations*, where a stakeholder assigns a right or obligation to another

stakeholder, and *provisions*, where a stakeholder provides another stakeholder some object.

We identified 28 rights and obligations that allow stakeholders to delegate rights and obligations to other stakeholders. In the models for delegations, the *actions* are from a restricted transitive-verbs set (e.g. *restrict*, *require*, *deny* and *permit*) and the *object* of the delegation is an activity (implied right or obligation) performed by the *subject*. For example, consider right $R_{526.3}$ from §164.526, below, that describes a right of the CE to delegate an obligation to the individual.

$R_{526,3} {\rm :}$ The CE $may\ require$ the individual to make written requests for amendment to their PHI.

The corresponding semantic model in Figure 5 illustrates the right in Lines 1–15. Balancing this right requires extracting the implied obligation (Lines 4–14) and modeling that activity separately in Lines 15–24. Implied rights and obligations are rarely unconditional. For example, before the individual is obligated, the CE must first obligate the individual by invoking their right to do so, which further requires the CE to satisfy constraints on their right to obligate the individual.

```
1
     activity [ right ] {
2
          subject = CE
3
          action = require
4
          object = activity {
5
               subject = individual
               action = request
6
7
               object = activity {
8
                    subject = CE
9
                    action = amend
10
                    object = PHI : individual
11
               instrument = writing
12
13
               target = CE
14
          }
15
     }
15
     activity [ obligation ] {
          subject = individual
16
          action = request
17
18
          object = activity {
19
               subject = CE
20
               action = amend
21
               object = PHI : individual
22
          instrument = writing
23
24
     3
```

Figure 5: Example Right Balanced with an Obligation

We identified 41 rights and obligations that describe provisions, a class of stakeholder interactions where one stakeholder provides an object and another stakeholder receives that object. Semantic models for these activities also use specific actions such as *disclose, inform, notify, provide,* and *receive.* In addition to the subject attribute of the activity, a complementary co-requisite attribute must be specified as either the *source* (the provider) or *target* (the receiver). Consider the right $R_{0.2}$ from §164.520:



$\textbf{R_{520.2:}}$ The individual has ~a~right~to receive notice from the GHP. 164.522(a)(1)

In Figure 6, the right $R_{520.2}$ is modeled in Lines 1–6 and balanced by the right $R_{520.2,B}$ modeled in Lines 7– 12. The action in $R_{520.2}$ is *receive* and has the corequisite attribute *source* (the provider of the notice). Some actions in provisions will have a binary opposite where the subject of the activity assumes the value of the co-requisite attribute. For example, in the balancing of $R_{520.2,B}$, the action *provide* is a binary opposite to *receive*. As a result, the *subject* (Line 2) and *source* (Line 5) from $R_{520.2}$ are mapped onto the *target* (Line 11) and the *subject* (Line 8) in $R_{520.2,B}$, respectively.

1	activity [right] {
2	subject = individual
3	action = <i>receive</i>
4	object = notice
5	source = GHP
6	}
7	activity [obligation] {
8	subject = GHP
9	action = <i>provide</i>
10	object = notice
11	target = individual
12	}

Figure 6: Balancing Direct Provisions

Finally, we observed that when the purpose of an obligation is a provision, the purpose may be balanced by an implied right. For example, consider the obligation $O_{520.12}$ from §164.520, below:

 $\textbf{O_{520.12:}} The HCP must (c)(2) post the notice for an individual to read. (c)(2)(ii)(B)$

In Figure 7, obligation $O_{520.12}$ is modeled in Lines 1–10. The *purpose* (Line 5) is an activity that describes an implied right of the individual. We balance $O_{520.12}$ with the obligation $O_{520.12.B}$ modeled in Lines 11–15.

```
1
     activity [ obligation ] {
2
          subject = HCP
3
          action = post
          object = notice
4
5
          purpose = activity {
6
               subject = individual
               action = read
7
8
               object = notice
9
          }
10
     }
11
     activity [ right ] {
          subject = individual
12
13
          action = read
14
          object = notice
    }
15
```

Figure 7: Balancing Indirect Provisions

In summary, we show three ways to balance expressed rights and obligations with implied rights and obligations: delegations, direct provisions, and indirect provisions. Identifying implied rights and obligations helps ensure requirements coverage is more complete under the law.

5. Discussion and Future Work

The role of constraints in identifying conflicts between rights and obligations must still be considered. Herein, we only identify trivial conflicts by observing negation and type-similar values in semantic models. More sophisticated approaches are required to consider process conflicts in which the cause of a conflict is implicit in a chain of events. Lamsweerde et al. model conflicts at the goal-level [20]. Modeling constraints will provide insight into model symmetries and enable queries to assist in partitioning requirements [24], and to identify more sophisticated conflicts.

The distinction between who provides information to satisfy constraints and who validates such information requires further investigation. Consider the following RNLS, a constraint from §164.520, Section (a)(2)(i): *The individual is enrolled in a group health plan (GHP)*. To satisfy this constraint, an individual who intends to receive services from a healthcare provider (HCP) might *provide* contact information for their GHP, who would in turn validate the individual's enrollment for the HCP. Using our methodology, one can iterate through constraints to distinguish between who provides and who validates such information.

The identified phrase heuristics are limited to this dataset and may be insufficient or inconsistent when analyzing other regulations and policies. Only three of the 14 phrase heuristics identified in our pilot study [5] were observed in this study; largely due to the summary nature of that dataset. As for inconsistencies, the English word "may" means either "is permitted to…" or "is expected to…" in which only the first form indicates a right or permission. We are currently completing an analysis of the remaining sections of the HIPAA Privacy Rule that will enable us to further evaluate the reliability of these phrase heuristics.

Finally, certain events appear in the pre-conditions of rights and obligations and other events are byproducts of invoking rights and obligations. We have developed a process to systematically identify and link these events to states containing rights and obligations [BA06]. We believe the state-transition diagrams produced by this process are useful to further reason about and analyze these temporal relationships, which we will continue to investigate in future work.

To date, we have validated our work within the healthcare domain. We plan to further validate this methodology, heuristics and patterns within the context of financial regulations and aviation standards to determine its applicability beyond healthcare. Without further validation, it is premature to automate that which is currently performed manually. However,



because the methodology is content-driven, we can reasonably predict that the formatting of a particular document in no way limits its applicability.

In conclusion, we presented the results of applying the Semantic Parameterization process in an extended methodology to extract rights and obligations from healthcare regulation text. We present our approach to handle exceptions, compare rights and obligations and identify ambiguities. We also identify implied rights and obligations necessary to ensure requirements coverage and consider multiple viewpoints.

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