Srinivas Shakkotai - Game theoretic models for network resource allocation: Is Paris metro pricing the right way to go?

The Internet infrastructure is composed of heterogeneous access providers, both at the core as well as at the edges. Whereas the core is constrained to be packet neutral, the edge, particularly in the wireless domain, is less restricted. In this talk, we will consider the impact of constructing multiple virtual networks in the fashion of Paris Metro Pricing at the level of access links. here, users could be charged varying tolls for accessing different virtual networks. We begin with a simple utility model at the user level depending only on throughput, and show that in the worst case, the service provider cannot extract a significantly higher revenue with tiered services. We then consider utility that depends on both throughput and congestion. We show that a case can be made for Paris Metro type schemes when users have heterogeneous dis-utilities to congestion, and choose both their congestion control protocol, as well as the virtual network in a way that maximizes their overall utility.