General Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer Transmissions: A Quantum Game Perspective
Weiman Sun and Shengling Wang
Beijing Normal University, Beijing Normal University

The peer-to-peer transmission is a mainstream in challenged network environments. Yet, the free rider phenomenon in peer-to peer transmissions presses a need for incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions of data transmission. As a result, it is imperative to answer the questions: whether and to what extent an incentive mechanism can invoke such contributions? To answer these questions, we employ an n-player continuous quantum game model to analyze extrinsic incentive mechanisms (promoting cooperative behaviors by offering rewards), and use the quantum prisoner’s dilemma model to analyze intrinsic incentive mechanisms (encouraging reciprocal cooperation by exploiting internal bounds). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer transmissions from a quantum game perspective. Such a perspective is adopted because the extended strategy space in the quantum game broadens the range for searching optimal strategies and the introduction of entanglement makes the proposed analytical frameworks more practical due to the consideration of the peers’ relationships in decision-making. Our proposed quantum game-based analytical frameworks are generic because they are compatible with classic game-based schemes. Our analytical results can provide straightforward insights on evaluating the potential of incentive mechanisms and can serve as important references for designing new incentive mechanisms.